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INTRODUCTION
Among the most important roles played by government in con-
temporary society is ensuring that all people have access to health care
and are protected from unsafe products and environmental conditions.
The average person encounters numerous potentially dangerous situa-
tions each and every day, involving food, water, medications, vehi-
cles, traffic, electronic equipment, machinery, clothing, and, of course,
the air. In recent decades, pervasive government regulation in all of
these areas and others has created an expectation of a minimal level of
safety, provided or at least ensured by the government. Everyone
needs health care, and government plays a significant role in making
sure that even those who cannot afford to pay for it have access to at
least the bare minimum necessary care.
* Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School
of Law. Thanks to Bill Marshall, David Seipp, Wendy Gordon, Ken Simons, Gary
Lawson, Jim Fleming, Abby Moncrieff, Paul Gugliuzza, Linda McClain, Colin Diver,
Pnina Lahav, and Kathy Zeiler for comments and suggestions.
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Despite government’s pervasive role in ensuring public safety
and access to health care, the U.S. Supreme Court has firmly rejected
government liability under the federal Constitution for failing to keep
safety-related promises, in language that rejects a constitutional basis
for any supposed right to health care.1 The Court explained that the
Constitution “forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, lib-
erty, or property without ‘due process of law,’ but its language cannot
fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to
ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.”2
Thus, as the law currently stands, any government liability for failing
to provide access to health care or to protect people from danger
would have to arise from state law or from sub-constitutional law such
as tort-claims legislation or other statutes.
Although there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court
would retreat from its hesitancy to recognize positive rights under the
Constitution, the Court’s reasoning in the portion of its opinion in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius3 rejecting the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s4 (PPACA’s) expansion
of state Medicaid programs is in strong tension with the absence of
positive rights under the Constitution. This may seem odd, since in
that decision the Court rejected an effort by the other branches of the
federal government to provide health care to a greater number of peo-
ple, but the decision’s reasoning makes no sense if it does not recog-
nize a right to health care against the states.5 The Court invalidated the
PPACA’s expansion of Medicaid because it found that the law’s re-
quirement that states expand Medicaid coverage or lose all of their
federal Medicaid funding was coercive, and thus that Congress could
not condition continued funding on compliance with the PPACA.6 In
other words, it was unrealistic to expect states to repeal their Medicaid
programs in order to avoid additional obligations imposed by the
PPACA. Government provision of health care for those unable to af-
ford it on their own is so central to the current role of government that
placing a new burdensome condition on continued receipt of vital fed-
eral support for the program is inherently coercive.
1. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
This decision is discussed in Part I below. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying
text.
2. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
3. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
5. See infra notes 40–55 and accompanying text. R
6. See infra notes 40–55 and accompanying text. R
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In addition to government’s felt obligation to ensure access to
health care, pervasive health and safety regulation indicates that gov-
ernment feels a similar obligation to protect people from danger
through safety and environmental laws. However, the proliferation of
legislation procured by special-interest groups, which irrationally
shields these groups from regulatory control, threatens this obligation.
By “irrationally,” I mean that no sound public policy basis justifies the
exemption, but rather the exemption arises from raw political favorit-
ism due to lobbying, campaign support, etc. The principal example of
this sort of legislation used in this article is the 1976 Proxmire
Amendment, which prohibits the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) from limiting the potency of vitamins and restrains the agency
from regulating vitamins and food supplements generally.7
Under current constitutional standards, statutes such as the
Proxmire Amendment are viewed as economic regulation and are re-
viewed under the very deferential “rational basis” standard.8 Statutes
like this are almost always upheld because Congress provides the pub-
lic with a rational-sounding, public-interest justification for its legisla-
tion, even if the true reasons for drafting such legislation have more to
do with providing benefits to key political supporters.9 Regardless of
whether a court would ever hold a statute like the Proxmire Amend-
ment unconstitutional, in today’s environment—in which the average
person is fundamentally dependent on government intervention in or-
der to maintain his or her health, safety, and welfare—such statutes
are an abdication of Congress’s responsibility to the public and a be-
trayal of those who depend on government in myriad ways every day.
Part I of this Article contains a general discussion of positive
constitutional rights doctrine. Part II discusses how the logic of the
decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
7. See W. Steven Pray, The FDA, Vitamins, and the Dietary Supplement Industry,
U.S. PHARMACIST (2008), http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/d/consult%20your
%20pharmacist/c/11002/. The Act was sponsored by Senator William Proxmire, who
“became the standard bearer for the supplement industry.” Id.
8. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 516 (1934). Two members of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit recently argued that scrutiny of economic regulation should be height-
ened on the ground that such regulation is often a barely disguised transfer of re-
sources between competing interests. See Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,
480–83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Sentelle, C.J., and Brown, J., concurring).
9. Cf. Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). Ma-
cey’s article explains very clearly and succinctly the way interest groups procure
legislation and undercut the public interest. He acknowledges that courts are unlikely
to hold such statutes unconstitutional and thus suggests using statutory construction to
protect the public interest.
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assumes an affirmative government duty to ensuring access to health
care. Part III addresses how statutes like the Proxmire Amendment
and other interest-group exceptions to health and safety regulation are
inconsistent with government’s obligation to provide for the health,
safety, and welfare of the public.
I.
POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND DESHANEY
Much ink has been spilled on the question whether government
has or should have a constitutional duty to provide for people’s basic
needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education.10
While positive rights in a few important areas such as education, envi-
ronmental regulation, and labor law have been enshrined in state con-
stitutions,11 more general positive rights to health, safety, and welfare
have not been recognized in the United States.12 By and large, the
10. A good starting point for considering positive constitutional rights in U.S. fed-
eral constitutional law is the work of Frank Michelman. See Frank I. Michelman, In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 7 (1969). For a more comprehensive, globally focused view, see KATHARINE G.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012).  Discussion of posi-
tive rights in other countries is beyond the scope of this Article.
11. See EMILY J. ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013) (discussing edu-
cational and environmental provisions in state constitutions); see also, e.g., ILL.
CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality
public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the
secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as the General
Assembly provides by law. The State has the primary responsibility for financing the
system of public education.)”; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 2, cl. 2 (“A maximum period
of 8 hours is a regular day’s work in all industries and employment except agriculture
and stock raising. The legislature may change this maximum period to promote the
general welfare.”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Com-
monwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”). But
see ZACKIN, supra, at 131 (discussing how the Montana provision originally allowed
only reductions in the number of hours constituting a “regular day’s work”). This
Article’s focus on the federal constitutional implications of the Court’s reasons for
striking down the PPACA’s expansion of Medicaid is not meant to minimize the
importance of state constitutions and state programs to comprehending government’s
role in the United States.
12. Interestingly, Ed Rubin has claimed that vehement opposition to the PPACA
has been inspired at least in part by the fear that the law’s passage is a step toward the
recognition of positive constitutional rights in the United States. See Edward Rubin,
The Affordable Care Act, the Constitutional Meaning of Statutes, and the Emerging
Doctrine of Positive Constitutional Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1639, 1643
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expansion of the welfare and regulatory state in the developed world is
viewed in the United States as a matter of legislative largesse rather
than constitutional right.13
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the notion of a federal posi-
tive right to government protection or services. In the well-known
DeShaney decision, the Court came down firmly against reading the
federal Constitution to create positive rights. Young Joshua DeShaney
was severely injured by his custodial father despite active monitoring
for child abuse by the Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices. In ruling on a substantive due process claim brought against the
department, the Court stated that “nothing in the language of the Due
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause
is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guaran-
tee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”14 Although
DeShaney could be read narrowly to apply only to protection from
private violence, the opinion is widely understood to foreclose the rec-
ognition of positive constitutional rights under the Constitution.15
Of course, an absence of positive rights under the Constitution
does not mean that legislatures in the United States have not created
extensive social welfare and public-safety programs. These programs
are a testament to a widely shared conception of the role of govern-
ment. Social welfare programs demonstrate the understanding that
government has an important role to play in providing for basic human
needs, whether motivated by an equality norm16 or a justice norm.17
(2012). I do not necessarily disagree with him, but the lesson I draw from the Su-
preme Court’s invalidation of the Act’s Medicaid expansion is somewhat different
from Rubin’s point.
13. Ed Rubin’s article offers the tantalizing thesis that legislators engage in consti-
tutional interpretation when they create social welfare programs, and that statutes like
the PPACA are best understood as legislative recognition of a constitutional duty to
provide the services included in such programs. Id. at 1694–1701.
14. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
15. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2271, 2272–73 (1990). In addition to DeShaney, Professor Bandes discusses Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In Webster, the Supreme Court
cited DeShaney as support for its decision to uphold restrictions on public provision
of abortion services. The Webster Court quoted DeShaney’s key language: “our cases
have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”
Webster, 492 U.S. at 507 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196).
16. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14–15 (1971) (“[S]ocial and economic
inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they
result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged
members of society.”).
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Public-safety programs, such as food-safety regulation and prescrip-
tion drug testing, demonstrate government’s role in ensuring public
safety, whether driven by humanitarian values or the importance of
product safety assurances to the functioning of the market. In devel-
oped democracies, governments that fail to provide sufficient social
welfare programs or adequate public safety regulation would have dif-
ficulty staying in power.
A country’s “constitution” is not simply a piece of paper that
spells out its governmental structure and grants rights to the public.
Rather, an evaluation of the “Constitution” of the United States should
mean examining the entire apparatus of governance, and certainly
should not be confined to the text of the document adopted in 1789
(with amendments) and court decisions that purport to interpret that
text.18 A holistic understanding of government in the United States
reveals that, as is the case in many other developed countries, provid-
ing for the health, safety, and welfare of citizens is among the primary
obligations of government. These obligations are so well established
that they should be thought of as constitutional in character.
One further point of limitation is in order. The positive right to
governmental protection discussed in this Article may not apply to all
governments at all times. The rights discussed here are most common
in comparatively wealthy, relatively developed democracies where
governments have the resources to provide for their citizens’ health,
safety, and welfare, and in which the people demand such protection.
At lesser stages of economic or political development, or in radically
different social arrangements, a different conception of the role of
government may exist, and it would not be appropriate to measure
those societies by the standards developed here.19 Although it is hard
to imagine a society with a government that has the capacity to imple-
ment these standards but which nonetheless takes no responsibility for
providing health care, or where irrational interest group objections to
health and safety programs were deemed appropriate by some cogni-
zable standard, absent a positive right to health and safety programs in
their own right, the reasons that could justify condemning these alter-
17. See J. Donald Moon, The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State (dis-
cussing non-equality-based arguments in support of state provision of welfare), in
DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 27, 27–52 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988).
18. For discussion of a similar theory, see ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 41–73 (2d ed. 2003) (analyzing the structures that
comprise the American constitutional system).
19. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (explaining that his theory of
justice applies in some, but not all, societies).
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native situations would necessarily be different from those advocated
here.
II.
AFFORDABLE CARE AND POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
The more than eleven million words of the PPACA can be por-
trayed as instituting, among many others, three major reforms related
to the provision of health care. First, to encourage everyone who can
afford health insurance to purchase it, the Act imposes a tax penalty
on individuals without health insurance.20 Second, the Act facilitates
the creation of health-insurance markets with subsidies for lower-in-
come individuals and families.21 Third, the Act requires states to sub-
stantially expand eligibility for Medicaid, the state-administered,
federally subsidized government health-insurance program people for
with incomes below 130% of the federal poverty level.22 Opponents of
the Act challenged many of its provisions.23 Although before National
Federation of Independent Business was decided, most public atten-
tion was focused on the requirement that individuals purchase health
insurance,24 the Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate but
struck down the mandatory expansion of Medicaid eligibility.25
Whether Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce
Clause when it required millions of Americans to purchase health in-
surance, and whether this mandate was nonetheless sustainable under
Congress’s power to tax and spend for the general welfare, are ques-
tions beyond the scope of this Article.26 What is important to this Arti-
cle is the Court’s basis for striking down the expansion of Medicaid
eligibility. The Court found that Congress had exceeded its power
under the Spending Clause because states had no real choice but to
20. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2013).
21. See Health Insurance Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/
healthcare/insurance/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
22. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581–82 (2012).
23. See id. at 2577.
24. See Arthur J. Baker, Note, Fundamental Mismatch: The Improper Integration
of Individual Liberty Rights into Commerce Clause Analysis of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 259, 260 (2011) (“Even though the
PPACA faces challenges on a number of legal grounds, the one drawing the greatest
amount of public attention centers on the requirement—popularly known as the ‘indi-
vidual mandate’—that most Americans purchase health insurance.” (footnote
omitted)).
25. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07.
26. See id. at 2591, 2600.
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comply with Congress’s wish to expand Medicaid.27  The chain of
reasoning that led to this conclusion is described below.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution grants Congress
broad powers to tax and spend, providing, “The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States.”28 The breadth of the power to
spend is captured in Congress’s power to “provide for the . . . general
Welfare of the United States.”29 It has long been understood that this
power is not limited by the enumeration of powers that follows in the
remainder of Article I, Section 8.30 In other words, Congress may ap-
propriate federal funds to pursue its conception of the general welfare
even if it lacks constitutional authority to regulate pursuant to that
selfsame conception.31
Congress can use its spending power to go beyond the Constitu-
tion’s enumeration of congressional power in two ways. First, it can
engage in pure spending activity.32 For example, even if Congress
lacks an enumerated power over education, it could use federal funds
to establish a federal university system or even a federal system of
secondary education. Second, Congress can make federal funds avail-
able with strings attached—strings that it might not otherwise use di-
rectly—to compel states to act according to its wishes.33 For example,
27. Id. at 2603–07.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
29. Id.
30. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (recognizing that the spending
power is not confined to advancing Congress’s constitutionally enumerated powers);
see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
31. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206; see also Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
32. For example, the federal government spends federal funds directly on federal
activities such as the operation of the National Park Service and the Environmental
Protection Agency. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. F, tit. 1, 128 Stat. 2130, 2402 (“For expenses neces-
sary for the management, operation, and maintenance of areas and facilities adminis-
tered by the National Park Service and for the general administration of the National
Park Service, $2,275,773,000, of which $9,923,000 for planning and interagency co-
ordination in support of Everglades restoration and $81,961,000 for maintenance, re-
pair, or rehabilitation projects for constructed assets shall remain available until
September 30, 2016.”); id. at tit. 2, 128 Stat. at 2422 (“For environmental programs
and management, including necessary expenses, not otherwise provided for . . .
$2,613,679,000, to remain available until September 30, 2016.”).
33. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (upholding a federal statute conditioning portions of
federal highway funds on state enactment of twenty-one-year-old drinking age limits,
even though federal government might not have power to impose a twenty-one-year-
old drinking age as substantive legislation).
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Congress has provided funding for family-planning clinics on the con-
dition that they not counsel their patients on the use of abortion as a
method of family planning, and the Supreme Court has upheld this
condition, even though it is clear that Congress lacks the power to
directly prohibit abortion counseling.34
The most controversial use of conditions on the expenditure of
federal funds occurs when federal money is provided to states on the
condition that the states follow federal law in their use of the funds.
Two well-known examples of this involve the withholding of a por-
tion of federal highway funds from states unless they enacted the fifty-
five-mile-per-hour speed limit and the twenty-one-year-old drinking
age.35 This is how the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion was supposed to
be accomplished.36 Medicaid is one of many federal-state cooperative
programs through which the federal government provides funding for
a program that is to be administered by the states.37 These programs
present a double threat to federalism norms because not only do they
allow the federal government to regulate beyond Congress’s enumer-
ated powers, but they also allow Congress to enlist state governments
to administer federal programs. In recent decades, the Court has found
this to be contrary to federalism norms if federal funds are not in-
volved.38  In the PPACA, Congress conditioned continued federal
Medicaid funding to states on the condition that the states expand their
Medicaid programs.39 The federal government would pay for one hun-
dred percent of the cost of expansion for the first three years, and
ninety percent of the cost thereafter.40
Due to federalism concerns, the Supreme Court has limited Con-
gress’s ability to place conditions on state receipt of federal funds by
holding that these conditions must satisfy five requirements.41 The
34. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
35. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, § 6(a),
98 Stat. 437; Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
239, 87 Stat. 1046.
36. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
37. See generally Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343
(1989).
38. The Supreme Court created the anti-commandeering doctrine in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in which the Court declared that “[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.” Id. at 188. The doctrine was subsequently applied in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
39. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
40. Id. at 2601 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1)).
41. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211 (1987). See generally Mitch-
ell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (providing an
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limitations are as follows: (1) the spending must be for the general
welfare; (2) the condition must be clear so that the state knows what
obligations it assumes when it accepts federal funds; (3) the condition
must be related to the program for which funds are provided; (4) the
condition itself may not be unconstitutional, for example the govern-
ment could not require that a state impose cruel and unusual punish-
ments for a particular crime; (5) the state must not be coerced into
accepting the condition. This final condition turned out to be decisive
in the PPACA litigation because unlike prior conditions, which with-
drew a small proportion of a program’s funding for failure to comply
with the condition, the PPACA provided that states that failed to ex-
pand their Medicaid programs in compliance with the Act would lose
all of their federal Medicaid funding, which is an enormous amount of
money.42 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, found
that the federal government figuratively had placed “a gun to the
head” of the states, leaving them no choice but to accede to the expan-
sion of Medicaid and the increased costs that expansion would
entail.43
While this may be factually correct, it should be deemed legally
irrelevant because the majority of the Court could not deny, as Justice
Ginsburg suggested in dissent, that Congress remains free to repeal the
entire Medicaid program and reenact it with the increased coverage
required by the PPACA.44 But more important for present purposes,
overview of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as established by the Dole Court
and examining this doctrine in connection with the Supreme Court’s decision in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius).
42. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05. The Court also supported its
decision by characterizing the Medicaid expansion as a new program rather than an
amendment to the existing program. Id. at 2605–06. This characterization purportedly
supported the Court’s decision invalidating the expansion by refuting the argument
that the expansion was within Congress’s statutory reservation of power to alter or
amend the program, 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013), and by corroborating the Court’s con-
clusion that the states accepting pre-expansion Medicaid funding would be surprised
by the new condition on their acceptance of the funds.
43. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600–06.
44. See id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2606 n.14 (plurality
opinion) (responding that repeal and reenactment would be inhibited by practical con-
straints). The plurality’s weak response to Justice Ginsburg’s argument did not deny
its legal force. Rather, the plurality responded by refusing to engage the argument:
But it would certainly not be that easy. Practical constraints would plainly
inhibit, if not preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the ex-
isting program and putting every feature of Medicaid on the table for
political reconsideration. Such a massive undertaking would hardly be
“ritualistic.” . . . The same is true of Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that
Congress could establish Medicaid as an exclusively federal program.
Id.
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the Court’s reasoning reveals the constitutional significance of gov-
ernment provision of medical care to those unable to afford it.  The
only way to make sense of the Court’s conclusion that the PPACA’s
Medicaid expansion is coercive is if the Court believes (1) that it is
virtually inconceivable that states would stop providing medical care
to the poor, and (2) that it is impossible for states to do so without
federal help.
Why is it inconceivable to the Court that states would stop partic-
ipating in the Medicaid program, and perhaps severely cut back gov-
ernment-provided medical care for the poor, rather than accept the
Medicaid expansion? What is so coercive about giving states the
choice between no Medicaid and expanded Medicaid? The Court’s
analysis focuses on the magnitude of federal Medicaid funding as a
percentage of states’ overall budgets, finding it unbelievable that
states would feel free to walk away from federal funding that com-
prises ten percent or more of the state budget.45 But this analysis as-
sumes that the states would continue the Medicaid program, just
without federal funding. Are the states not free to simply end their
Medicaid programs, obviating the need for the federal subsidy by
eliminating that state expenditure? In my view, states do not feel free
to end Medicaid because providing medical care to people unable to
afford it has become to be viewed as one of the primary duties of
government, part of government’s obligation to provide for the health,
safety, and welfare of citizens. The expectation that government will
provide medical care for those who cannot afford it is so ingrained in
the mind of Americans that while adjustments can be made in light of
changing policy and available resources, wholesale abandonment of
the duty is unthinkable.46
The obligation to provide medical care does not necessarily mean
that the current Medicaid program is the only permissible method of
doing so, or that Medicaid must remain in place forever. As noted, the
Court expressly disclaimed the conclusion that an outright repeal of
Medicaid would be unconstitutional.47 There are many different ways
that government could provide health care to people unable to afford
45. Id, at 2604–05.
46. It might be suggested that states are coerced into maintaining Medicaid because
officials who abandoned Medicaid know that they would not be re-elected. This can-
not be the basis of a finding of coercion. The fact that the people of a state want to
participate in a federal program establishes the contrary, that participation is the vol-
untary choice of the people of the state.
47. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606 n.14.
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it.48 However, once a program like Medicaid is firmly in place, institu-
tions grow up around it and alternatives become less feasible. If Medi-
caid had never existed, health care might have been made available
through different programs, perhaps with cost controls, more publicly
owned and operated health-care facilities, more public medical
schools to increase the supply of medical professionals, or perhaps by
a network of private charitable institutions.49 As it is, extensive net-
works of institutions have taken shape in light of the Medicaid pro-
gram, involving thousands of government employees and private
medical providers. Eliminating Medicaid would be extremely disrup-
tive, supporting the Court’s conclusion that states would have felt co-
erced into accepting the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion. It would also
fail to recognize people’s reasonable expectations in an area of signifi-
cant moral weight. Given the interdependent relationships that have
grown up around Medicaid, it may be accurate to conclude that Con-
gress may not repeal Medicaid without providing a substitute.50
I do not mean to argue that Chief Justice Roberts would agree
with me and conclude that his analysis of the Medicaid expansion in
the Affordable Care Act means that he is committed to recognizing a
positive right to health care. In a similar context, Daniel Farber
pointed out that “there is something inherently suspect about an inter-
pretation so clever that it never would have occurred to the speaker or
the audience.”51 Indeed, I surmise that if my interpretation had oc-
48. For example, Congress could fund free or low-cost health care clinics, or it
could establish a publicly funded health-insurance program with deep discounts or
free coverage for those unable to afford premiums.
49. Although the Supreme Court did not find arguments similar to this persuasive in
DeShaney, in which the dissenters argued that the existence of the Department of
Social Services had displaced other potential child-protection institutions, acceptance
of them is implicit in the Court’s invalidation of the PPACA’s Medicaid exception.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. This reasoning resonates with one of Justice Brennan’s arguments in dissent in
DeShaney, that by establishing the Department of Social Services and placing respon-
sibility upon it for preventing child abuse, the State of Wisconsin had created reliance
on its institutions for this important function. Id. at 207–09; see also Jack M. Beer-
mann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1078, 1096 (“Government institutions invite people to rely on their pro-
grams. Reliance on government institutions leads to a strong normative argument for
government responsibility because government may crowd out other sources of aid.
When government fails to act as individuals legitimately anticipated, it is as if govern-
ment has yanked a chair out from under a person as she settled into the chair and
simultaneously discouraged others from aiding the falling person by assuring them
that government would provide the chair.”).
51. Daniel Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 927 (1986).
Farber was writing about arguments by Professors Frank Michelman and Laurence
Tribe that “Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, [426
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curred to Chief Justice Roberts, he would have rejected it. What I do
mean to argue is that Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning is inconsistent
with the rejection of a government obligation to provide health care,
for the reason that if government did not feel so obligated, it would
not feel coerced into expanding Medicaid in order to continue to re-
ceive federal Medicaid funding. Sometimes—and this seems to be the
case here—an opinion’s reasoning paints a court into a doctrinal cor-
ner it would rather not visit.52
Ed Rubin has argued that the vehement resistance to the PPACA
arose out of discomfort with the constitutional shift that the Act repre-
sents toward accepting positive rights.53 Rubin’s theory of the role of
statutory enactment in constitutional change is worth considering; in a
sense, it constitutes an institutional elaboration of Bruce Ackerman’s
theory of constitutional moments, under which constitutional change
does not require formal amendment of the written Constitution.54
Rubin believes that the enactment of the PPACA “encourages judges
to reverse DeShaney and hold the Due Process Clause guarantees min-
imal levels of safety and security.”55  In a democratic society,
landmark legislation like the PPACA is likely to reflect the society’s
normative commitments underlying what courts and other government
institutions recognize as constitutional law.
U.S. 833 (1976),] which struck down the federal minimum wage for state employees,
really established a constitutional right to welfare.” Id. at 926 (citing Frank
Michelman, States’ Rights and States’ Roles: The Permutations of “Sovereignty” in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1181–92 (1977); Laurence
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1075–76 (1977)).
52. An example of the Court painting itself into a doctrinal corner is Justice Rehn-
quist’s opinion for the Court in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 555 (1981). In that
decision, the Court held that when a state actor, pursuant to random and unauthorized
action, deprives a person of property, adequate post-deprivation remedies satisfy due
process. Implicit in this decision is that if the state decides not to provide a post-
deprivation remedy, a claim for a due process violation is stated, and the federal court
will order the state or local officials to compensate the victim of the deprivation. In
other words, states may not interpose a sovereign immunity defense in such cases—
there will be either a state tort remedy or a federal due process claim for damages.
Five years later, when the Court realized the implication of what it had done in Par-
ratt, it overruled that decision to the extent that negligent destruction of property
constitutes a constitutional “deprivation,” thus allowing states to immunize them-
selves and their officials from tort damages. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
328 (1986). The current Court may be more likely to overrule its decision invalidating
the Medicaid expansion than it is to recognize a positive federal constitutional right to
health care.
53. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 1643. R
54. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
55. Rubin, supra note 12, at 1704. R
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In my view, the enactment of a single statute, even a landmark
like the PPACA, does not provide a sufficient basis to create a consti-
tutional obligation. Thus, while I sympathize with Rubin’s view that
DeShaney should be reconsidered and that statutes can be strongly
indicative of society’s substantive commitments, I do not go so far as
Rubin and conclude that statutory enactment alone provides the basis
for constitutional evolution. Rather, in my view, it is the state’s felt
obligation to provide health care to the poor, as recognized by the
Supreme Court in its decision invalidating the PPACA’s Medicaid ex-
pansion, which pushes constitutional law down the road toward recog-
nizing positive rights.
III.
THE PROXMIRE AMENDMENT AND INTEREST-GROUP
EXCEPTIONS TO HEALTH AND SAFETY
REGULATION
So far we have seen that the Court’s reasoning in National Feder-
ation of Independent Business v. Sebelius makes sense only if it as-
sumes a government obligation to ensure access to health care. This
leads to a more general consideration of government’s responsibility
for ensuring health and safety. As noted, in addition to legislation like
the PPACA and the Medicaid program, Congress and the states have
enacted numerous statutes designed to ensure a healthy environment,
safe and healthy workplaces, and safe and healthy products. Building
on the proposition that these government programs are evidence of a
commitment to governmental action in the health and safety areas, the
central question of this Part of the Article is what the legal system
should have to say about instances in which it appears that the princi-
pal explanation for a statute or regulation that undercuts public health
and safety is government catering to special interests. In this regard, I
focus on the Proxmire Amendment, which limits the federal Food and
Drug Administration’s power to regulate vitamins and supplements.56
This focus is designed to provoke a more general consideration of the
propriety of interest-group procurement of exceptions to health and
safety regulation.
A. Social Welfare Programs and Safety Regulation
The ubiquity of social welfare programs and public safety regula-
tions does not mean that government has become an absolute insurer
against risks in either area. Each society chooses for itself an appropri-
56. Pub. L. No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 410 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350 (2013)).
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ate level and form of government welfare programs and safety regula-
tion.  Decisions to limit or alter the scope of programs in either
category are not necessarily inconsistent with the programs’ underly-
ing normative bases, and often reflect trade-offs with countervailing
values such as self-reliance, encouraging economic activity, and enti-
tlement to retain the fruits of one’s own labors. Also, there is always
the concern that a desirable program in theory will be difficult to exe-
cute in practice due to problems inherent in the processes and prac-
tices of government. To put it as simply as possible, government
programs often suffer from serious defects, many of which stem from
distortions inherent in the political process.
One of the greatest difficulties confronting government programs
is the tendency for government’s coercive power to be subverted for
private gain.57  Although this pathology was recognized long ago by
the Framers of the United States Constitution, who tried to combat it
with the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances, in
recent decades the problem has been the focus of legal and political
scholarship under the rubric of public or social choice.58 Many of
these scholars are deeply suspicious of all government activity, both
redistributive and regulatory, because they fear that government has
been captured by powerful interest groups that use their power in der-
ogation of the public interest.59 For some, the only good government
program is no government program at all.60
Nonetheless, many government programs do serve the public in-
terest, even if some of their elements are infected by political consid-
erations unrelated to their overall social welfare goals. Of course, it
57. See Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey’s
Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 197–99 (1991) (discussing capture
theory).
58. Public-choice or social-choice theories explain the substantive content of the
law by analyzing the political process that produces the law rather than by focusing on
the public interest. For a general introduction to the theories from a legal perspective,
see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Intro-
duction, 90 MICH. L. REV. 6 (1991).
59. See James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public
Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE—
II, at 11, 18–19 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds., 1984); Jonathan Macey, Transaction
Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to
Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988); Jonathan Macey, Promoting Pub-
lic-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
60. See, e.g., FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EX-
TRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 170 (1997) (“The one unambiguous solution
for reducing rent extraction is reducing the size of the state itself and its power to
threaten, expropriate, and transfer.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\18-2\NYL202.txt unknown Seq: 16  8-SEP-15 11:47
292 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:277
may be difficult, if not impossible, to be certain whether any particular
program is predominantly in the public interest or if it primarily bene-
fits powerful interest groups. The fact that a program’s origins or ele-
ments of its design can be traced to interest group lobbying is not
enough to condemn its existence. To take a simple example, consider
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, which granted the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration federal approval authority over medi-
cal devices.61 In the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
interest in federal regulation of medical devices had been growing for
some time, and that interest became acute after thousands of women
were injured by the Dalkon Shield intrauterine birth control device.62
The adoption of the Medical Device Amendments in the wake of the
Dalkon Shield episode looks like a classic case of a regulatory pro-
gram adopted to serve the public interest (or at least placate public
outrage) in the wake of a disastrous event.
The problem with this description of the adoption of the Medical
Device Amendments is that medical device manufacturers were one of
the powerful interest groups pushing for federal regulation.63 When-
ever regulatory subjects favor the adoption of regulation, it raises the
suspicion that the true purpose of the regulation is to limit competi-
tion, head off more stringent regulation from some other governmental
unit, or both. In this case, manufacturers sought federal regulation af-
ter the State of California instituted pre-market regulatory approval
requirements for medical devices, and other states enacted their own
regulatory requirements.64 The federal statute preempts state regula-
tion of medical devices to the extent that the state laws impose “re-
quirement[s] . . . different from, or in addition to” federal safety or
effectiveness requirements imposed under the amendments.65 This
provision relieved medical device manufactures from potentially
stricter state regulation and avoided the complexity of multiple and
61. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
62. See David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV.
95, 101 (2005).
63. See Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption of Common Law Tort Awards by
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 509, 551–52
(1996) (discussing fear of state regulation as a reason for the law’s preemption
provision).
64. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2008) (citing 1970 Cal.
Stat. 327,076; Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal
Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 703
n.66 (1997)).
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2013).
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inconsistent regulatory requirements.66 The Amendments also allowed
medical devices already on the market to continue being sold without
any government approval, further undercutting the potential safety
benefits of pre-market screening of medical devices.67
The fact that a statute is not perfect and that its imperfections are
due to lobbying by powerful interests does not mean that the statue is
worthless or that the public would be safer had the admittedly imper-
fect regulatory program never been implemented. In a democracy, the
balancing of competing interests is to be expected.68 Often, the best
that can be hoped for is that the tendency of government to cater to
powerful, narrow interests can be tempered, especially when public
health and safety are at stake. In public choice terms, this can be ac-
complished when political entrepreneurs attract the support of broad
general interests with sufficient voting power to overcome the political
power of narrow, moneyed interests.69
B. Regulation of Vitamins and Supplements
Now to the Proxmire Amendment. To make a long story about
FDA attempts to regulate vitamins and supplements very short, after
years of considering issues surrounding the health effects of vitamins
and supplements, in 1973 the FDA adopted rules requiring agency re-
view of any vitamin or supplement with more than 150% of the rec-
66. At the time the Amendments were passed, few—if any—imagined that the fed-
eral statute would preempt state common-law product liability claims. See Riegel, 552
U.S. at 340–42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, H.R. REP. No. 94–853, at
45 (1976)). However, during the administration of President George W. Bush, the
FDA advocated for such preemption, and the Supreme Court has been receptive to the
arguments for preemption made then by the government and industry and more re-
cently by industry alone. See, e.g., id. at 317–18 (majority opinion) (discussing how
the premarket approval process supported preemption).
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A) (2013); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 478 (1996) (explaining that pre-1976 devices could stay on the market with-
out FDA approval through “grandfathering” provisions).
68. Recent world events show that in fledgling democracies, it may be difficult for
elected leaders to abandon the “winner takes all” mentality that often characterizes
undemocratic regimes. This leads to great dissatisfaction among those in the populace
who did not support the elected leaders, and even among those who voted for the
elected leaders without embracing all of the new leaders’ programs. Instability and
even revolt may follow. The best example of this is Egypt, where the nation’s first
freely elected government was overthrown after mass protests. See, e.g., David D.
Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi Is Taken into Military Custody,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A1 (reporting on the removal of the country’s first demo-
cratically elected president).
69. See Beermann, supra note 57, at 189. R
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ommended daily allowance of a vitamin.70 The FDA was concerned
that high-dosage vitamins could have negative health effects.71 Indus-
try fought the rules tooth and nail, ultimately getting them overturned
via judicial review amid efforts in Congress to limit the FDA’s author-
ity in the area.72 The industry mobilized popular support, informing
consumers that the FDA was trying to take away their vitamins and
supplements.73 The FDA tried again in 1975,74 and this time Wiscon-
sin Senator William Proxmire led efforts in Congress to prevent the
FDA from restricting the potency of vitamins and supplements.75
Proxmire’s efforts resulted in passage of the 1976 Vitamins and Min-
erals Amendments, also known as the Proxmire Amendment.76 Ac-
cording to the FDA’s website, the Proxmire Amendment “stop[s]
FDA from establishing standards limiting potency of vitamins and
minerals in food supplements or regulating them as drugs based solely
on potency.”77 One scholar has characterized the effects of the
Amendment as follows: “congressional interference with the FDA vir-
tually negated its mission of protecting the American public from dan-
70. See Label Statements; Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed.
Reg. 20,708 (Aug. 2, 1973) (final rule); Special Dietary Foods, 38 Fed. Reg. 2143
(Jan. 19, 1973) (proposed rule).
71. The indeterminate health consequences of high-dose vitamins and supple-
ments—for instance, the recently discovered potential link between vitamin E and an
increased risk of prostate cancer—have given rise to ongoing research efforts and
media attention. For an overview of research in the area, see Paul Offit, The Vitamin
Myth: Why We Think We Need Supplements, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2013), http://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/07/the-vitamin-myth-why-we-think-we-
need-supplements/277947/ (“In 2007, researchers from the National Cancer Institute
examined 11,000 men who did or didn’t take multivitamins. Those who took multiv-
itamins were twice as likely to die from advanced prostate cancer.”).
72. See Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974); H.R.
643, 93d Cong. (1973) (Food Supplement Amendment, introduced by Rep. Craig
Hosmer).
73. Opposition to the FDA’s efforts regarding vitamins and supplements also be-
came a libertarian cause, as exemplified by an article from 1973 that was more re-
cently posted by a user in an online forum supporting Ron Paul. See Gary Allen,
Vitamins: Federal Bureaucrats Want to Take Yours, AM. OP., Sept. 1973, republished
at FrankRep, 1973 Article: FDA and the War on Vitamins, by Gary Allen, RON PAUL
FORUMS (Jan. 29, 2012, 1:27 PM), http://www.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?
356646-1973-Article-FDA-and-the-War-on-Vitamins-by-Gary-Allen.
74. See Food for Special Dietary Uses, 40 Fed. Reg. 23,244 (May 28, 1975).
75. See Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Kennedy, 572 F.2d 377, 379–82 (2d Cir.
1978) (discussing the history of the FDA’s efforts to regulate vitamins and supple-
ments, and Senator Proxmire’s sponsorship of legislation limiting the FDA’s
authority).
76. See Health Research and Health Services Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
278, § 501(a), 90 Stat. 401, 410 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350 (2013)).
77. Significant Dates in FDA History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/milestones/ucm128305.htm.
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gerous doses of vitamins.”78 This is by no means a universal view, and
some believe that the FDA has plenty of authority to act against de-
ceptively marketed and unhealthy vitamins and supplements.79
Convincing people to part with their money to consume danger-
ous or at best useless products seems firmly engrained in American
culture, alongside too-good-to-be-true investment schemes and the in-
dividual right to bear arms. Vitamins, supplements, and weight-loss
products with no proof of efficacy are sold in legitimate department
stores, pharmacies, and nutrition retailers, and on the Internet and late-
night television.80 For the remainder of this Article, I will assume that
78. See W. Steven Pray, The FDA, Vitamins, and the Dietary Supplement Industry,
33 U.S. PHARMACIST 10 (2008) http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/t/complemen
tary_and_alternative_medicine/c/11002/. More recent legislation continues the trend
begun by the Proxmire Amendment by allowing supplement makers to make unsub-
stantiated health claims as long as they follow guidelines established by law, includ-
ing the provision of disclaimers. See W. Steven Pray, Orrin Hatch and the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act: Pandora’s Box Revisited, 27 J. CHILD NEU-
ROLOGY 561, 562 (2012) (“When DSHEA was signed into law, FDA’s ability to safe-
guard the health of the American public was seriously compromised. DSHEA allows
herbs and other ‘dietary supplements’ to be sold without proof of safety or efficacy
being provided to the FDA for legitimate scientific review before they are mar-
keted.”); W. Steven Pray, Health Fraud and the Resurgence of Quackery in the
United States: A Warning to the European Union, 11 PHARMACEUTICALS POL’Y & L.
113 (2009); William J. Skinner, Allowable Advertising Claims for Dietary Supple-
ments, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 309 (1996).
79. See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of
Dietary Supplements, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 157 (2005) (arguing that modern
food-safety laws “provide FDA with greater substantive authority over dietary supple-
ments than they provide for conventional food”). Mr. Hutt is identified in the article as
legal counsel to the Council for Responsible Nutrition, which describes itself as “the
leading trade association representing dietary supplement manufacturers and ingredi-
ent suppliers.” Council for Responsible Nutrition: Who Is CRN?, COUNCIL FOR RE-
SPONSIBLE NUTRITION, http://www.crnusa.org/pdfs/CRNFactSheet_rev011713.pdf
(last visited June 28, 2015).
80. My favorite supplement (based on its advertisements, not any personal experi-
ence) is Ageless Male, which is apparently made from “an extract from the herbal
shrub called eurycoma longifolia jack that has been shown to have an effect on free
testosterone levels in the body.” See Why Ageless Male?, MY AGELESS MALE, http://
www.myagelessmale.com/how-does-ageless-male-work/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
It’s not clear what symptoms are caused by low testosterone levels. Just what does
Ageless Male do? Supplement sellers must be careful not to make any specific health
claims, so the word “support” has become the vagary used to describe the supple-
ment’s effect on whatever aspect of health it is marketed for. “This new and innova-
tive formula goes beyond supporting free testosterone levels so you can be the man
you want to be. Just two softgel per day also gives you support for a healthy sex life,
energy and incredible results in the gym.*” Id. The asterisk is to the disclaimer at the
bottom of the webpage that keeps the FDA off of the seller’s back: “These statements
have not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration. This product is not
intended to diagnose, treat, cure or prevent any disease.” Id.  To meet legal require-
ments, supplements cannot claim to cure or treat a disease, but they are allowed to
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the Proxmire Amendment is an example of legislation bought and paid
for by an industry that used the same deceptiveness to marshal politi-
cal support that it uses to sell its products to consumers.81 Those who
do not agree with this characterization of the Proxmire Amendment
can imagine some other federal statute in its place.82
Jonathan Macey’s reaction to the problem of legislation catering
to narrow, self-serving interest groups was to insist that statutory inter-
pretation be based on the public-interest-oriented justifications legisla-
tors provide for public consumption.83 Such justifications accompany
virtually all legislation, presumably because legislators do not want
supportive voters to realize that their proposed legislation aims to
please powerful interest-group supporters rather than to benefit broad
constituencies. Macey’s proposal is a step in the right direction, but it
is insufficient because even public-interest oriented interpretation of
legislation can sometimes limit the reach of important health and
safety regulation.84 In what follows, I speculate on a constitutional
basis for invalidating interest-group-procured health and safety regula-
tory exceptions.
make unsubstantiated claims that they “support” some aspect of health. See Structure/
Function Claims, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/Ingredients
PackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm2006881.htm (last updated Dec. 23, 2014).
For example, supplements can claim to “support heart health,” but cannot claim to
treat heart disease. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. R
81. There does not seem to be definitive scientific evidence to support taking vita-
mins or supplements. In fact, research collected by the Atlantic Monthly included
studies tending to indicate that if anything, certain types if supplements are associated
with increased mortality rates. See Offit, supra note 71. R
82. Before building a legal theory on the foundation of a category of interest-group
exceptions to health and safety regulation, it is necessary to pause to consider one of
the undoubtedly many problems with my analysis. In practice, it will be very difficult
to distinguish between limitations on the scope of health and safety laws based on
good-faith public-interest considerations and interest-group exceptions procured in the
darkened passageways of the legislative process. We instinctively avert our eyes when
we are satisfied with the outcome of the legislative process, for the same reason that
we do not want to ruin our meals by observing the sausage-making process. Interest
groups naturally try to protect themselves in the legislative process. Further, in many
programs, disagreements often center on the proper balance between regulation and
economic productivity, which means that the simple desire of a business sector to
avoid costly regulation is relevant to the public interest. The familiar phrase “it’s the
economy, stupid” illustrates how government is held accountable for economic well-
being. Especially in a regime under which reasonable limits on campaign contribu-
tions are unconstitutional, it will virtually always be possible to trace some important
aspect of legislation to the influence of narrow interest groups.
83. See Macey, supra note 9, at 252–56. R
84. See Beermann, supra note 57. R
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C. Health and Safety Exceptionalism and the Constitution
It is now time to return to the subject of government’s duty to
protect public health and safety, and special-interest statutes like the
Proxmire Amendment that violate this duty. As described in the Intro-
duction, the health and safety of virtually every citizen of a developed
country depends on myriad forms of government regulation. In the
name of safety, government regulates tap water, clothing, food, drugs,
cosmetics, soaps, building construction, transportation, workplaces, air
quality, water, soil, furniture—you name it, government regulates it.85
Much, if not all, of this regulation is evidence of government’s recog-
nition of its constitutional responsibility to promote public health and
safety. Because of their pernicious effects and their origins in pure
political favoritism, exceptions to health and safety regulation like the
Proxmire Amendment should be constitutionally suspect.86
Pervasive regulation contributes to constitutional transformation
by reflecting deeply held values, creating and shaping expectations,
and displacing alternatives means of meeting health and safety stan-
dards.87 Americans cannot imagine a world in which the food they
buy in supermarkets or order in restaurants is not subject to safety
standards established by government, if not actual government inspec-
tion. They would not tolerate, for example, tap water unsuitable for
drinking, cooking, or bathing, or ineffective and dangerous prescrip-
tion and over-the-counter drugs. When things go wrong, and the
health and safety of people is threatened by, for instance, a poorly
constructed building, adulterated food, or contaminated water, govern-
ment is blamed along with those directly responsible for the dangerous
product or activity.88
85. Government regulates for additional reasons as well, including the pursuit of
economic prosperity and promotion of national security.  The focus of this article is
on health and safety regulation.
86. This is not an argument that redistribution is inherently unconstitutional or that
any legislation that appears to be a naked interest-group transfer is constitutionally
suspect. The argument here is built upon the foundation of government’s obligation to
provide for its citizens’ health, safety, and welfare.
87. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text (discussing the role of regulation
and the potential displacement of private alternatives in understanding government’s
constitutional duties).
88. A very recent example of this is an apparent ignition defect in certain automo-
biles manufactured by General Motors, which led to sudden loss of power and the
failure of airbags to deploy. A great deal of attention has been focused on the National
Highway and Transportation Safety Administration’s failure to act after receiving
complaints about the problem. See Matthew L. Wald & Bill Vlasic, House to Investi-
gate Slow Response to Fault in G.M. Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2014, at B1.
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This does not mean that the Constitution requires government to
regulate each and every potential health or safety risk to a feasibility
standard, that is, it does not mean the government must regulate every
risk as effectively as possible. It does not mean that cuts to welfare
programs or deregulation relative to preexisting health and safety pro-
grams are inherently unconstitutional.  There is nothing unconstitu-
tional about taking many factors—such as economic productivity,
liberty, expertise, uncertainty of benefits and costs, and government
resources—into account in establishing the appropriate level of regu-
lation and welfare. What it does mean is that government should de-
cide whether to regulate based on an honest evaluation of relevant
policy considerations and not based on bare interest-group deals that,
for example, shield a favored industry sector from health or safety
regulation.89 In a sense, government’s obligations develop in a process
similar to the development of public international law—it is when
government feels obligated to regulate that regulation is understood to
be constitutionally required.90
The Proxmire Amendment appears to violate these principles. Al-
though the experts at the FDA thought that vitamins and supplements
should be subject to regulation to protect people’s health, industry
stirred up opposition and used its resources to procure friends in Con-
gress who convinced their colleagues to pass special legislation
prohibiting the agency from regulating these products according to its
ordinary standards.91 Vitamins and supplements are marketed as
preventing or curing numerous health problems, and the Proxmire
Amendment and other regulatory features allow them to be so mar-
89. I do not mean to argue that all interest-group-inspired legislation is unconstitu-
tional. In this Article, my focus is on interest-group-procured exceptions to health and
safety regulation, where the positive right to government protection should enhance
judicial scrutiny and provide arguments against such legislation or regulations in the
legislative and executive branches.  In a sense, this is a mirror image of Carolene
Products footnote 4—legislation that benefits a narrow, politically favored interest in
an area of positive rights should be questioned the same way that legislation prejudic-
ing a discrete and insular minority provokes heightened scrutiny. See United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (AM. LAW INST.
1987).
91. See Stephen Barrett, Assault on FDA Continues, 10 NUTRITION F. 21 (1993),
1993 WLNR 5115169 (“During the mid 1960s, when the FDA attempted to ban vari-
ous misleading claims, the industry organized a campaign to weaken the agency’s
jurisdiction over supplement products. The campaign resulted in passage in 1976 of
the Proxmire Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”); Stephen Barrett,
Proposed Labeling Rules Stir Controversy, 9 NUTRITION F. 9 (1992), 1992 WLNR
5019149 (“The health food industry knows how to generate huge amounts of commu-
nication to government officials. A similar campaign begun 20 years ago led to pas-
sage of the Proxmire Amendment.”).
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keted even if they are ineffective or even dangerous in the dosages
taken by many people.92 Highly formulaic labeling requirements allow
vitamins and supplements to be marketed without being classified as
drugs subject to FDA scrutiny and approval.93 For example, rather
than “curing” or “treating” prostate enlargement, which causes fre-
quent urination and other symptoms, supplements containing saw pal-
metto berry extract are marketed as “supporting prostate health,”94
even though clinical tests, taken as a whole, do not support claims that
the extract provides overall benefits to prostate health.95 The promo-
tional materials used to market vitamins and supplements create the
impression that these products are intended to treat or cure medical
conditions, despite the fine print at the bottom of the advertisement or
webpage that contradicts any such claims.96
Although the supporters of legislation like the Proxmire Amend-
ment will always cite legitimate policy concerns in support of their
legislation, let us assume for the sake of argument that we have identi-
fied a statute with no legitimate policy basis, one which constitutes an
exception to an important health or safety program and which was
made at the behest of powerful interest groups. The next question is,
92. Theoretically, dangerous vitamins and supplements can be removed from the
market. This happens occasionally when a supplement causes easily traceable health
problems. However, without any requirement for advance testing and proof that a
vitamin or supplement is safe and effective for its intended use, it is very difficult to
detect health problems caused by long-term use of vitamins and supplements.
93. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
417, §6, 108 Stat. 4325, 4329 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 343(r)(6) (2013)) (describing
labeling standards for dietary supplements).
94. See, e.g., Zyflament Prostate, NEW CHAPTER, http://www.newchapter.com/
zyflamend/zyflamend-prostate#product-information (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (web-
site promoting Zyflamend Prostate) (“Nature has provided us with an array of key
foods and herbs that, when sufficiently concentrated and intelligently blended, can
provide support for prostate health.* You can find these select ingredients in
Zyflamend Prostate, the unique herbal formula with a combined approach to prostate
health: helping to support normal urine flow, supporting a healthy antioxidant re-
sponse, and supporting overall prostate health.*”). The asterisks refer to a tiny box at
the bottom of the web page with the traditional disclaimer: “*These statements have
not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration. This product is not intended
to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease.” Id.
95. See Prostate Cancer Health Center: Saw Palmetto, WEBMD (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://www.webmd.com/prostate-cancer/saw-palmetto-and-the-prostate (observing
that while study results have been mixed, there is currently “not enough scientific
evidence to support the use of saw palmetto for reducing the size of an enlarged
prostate or for any other conditions”); see also Michael J. Barry et al., Effect of In-
creasing Doses of Saw Palmetto Extract on Lower Urinary Tract Symptoms: A Ran-
domized Trial, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1344 (2011) (finding that increasing doses of
saw palmetto extract was no more effective than a placebo in treating lower urinary
tract symptoms associated with benign prostatic hyperplasia).
96. See, e.g., supra note 94 (describing supplement-labeling requirements). R
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what should a court or other government institution do when con-
fronted with such a case? As noted, under current law, constitutional
challenges to regulation of this sort would be reviewed under the “ra-
tional basis” standard and would almost always be upheld. Although I
recognize that it would be a significant departure from current law and
a significant enhancement of the power of the federal courts over leg-
islation, my claim is that legislation like this is contrary to constitu-
tional principles and should be subject to stricter judicial scrutiny.
Instead of the rational basis test’s virtual rubber stamp, perhaps judi-
cial review in such cases could look more like the Supreme Court’s
review of agency rulemaking under the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard.97 In the Supreme Court’s authoritative exposition of arbi-
trary and capricious review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), the Court stated that an agency action should be rejected if the
agency “offered an explanation for its decision that . . . is so implausi-
ble that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.”98 Similar considerations could guide a determi-
nation that an exception to health and safety regulation made by Con-
gress violates constitutional principles—if Congress cannot provide a
truly plausible justification for its legislation, then these exceptions
should be viewed as violations of the government’s duty to protect
public health and safety.
I realize that this implies aggressive judicial review. The Su-
preme Court has recognized that the standard for judicial review of
agency action was inappropriate for judicial review of statutes for
minimal rationality.99 Relatedly, during the infamous Lochner era, in
which the Court engaged in aggressive judicial review of economic
regulation, Supreme Court Justices viewed a great deal of economic
regulation as having been procured by narrow group interests in con-
travention of the interests of the broader public.100 Although my argu-
97. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43–44 (1983) (describing the “arbitrary and capricious” standard).
98. Id. at 43.
99. Id. at 43 n.9 (“The Department of Transportation suggests that the arbitrary and
capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear
in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause. We do not view as
equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Con-
gress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory
mandate.”).
100. As members of the D.C. Circuit noted recently, Justice McReynolds, in dissent
in Nebbia v. New York, viewed the milk price controls approved in that case as the
product of interest-group favoritism. See Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 482
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (Sentelle, C.J., and Brown, J., concurring) (citing Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 557–58 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)). Justice Peckham’s
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ment is founded upon a positive right to have one’s health and safety
protected, enhanced scrutiny of interest-group exceptions to health and
safety regulation would be nowhere near as intrusive or complicated
as the recognition of a positive right. The latter would entail judicial
orders requiring the establishment and funding of a wholly new pro-
gram; the former would not.101
I do not mean to argue that courts should invalidate statutes
willy-nilly or order government to create programs and institutions to
actualize courts’ conception of positive rights.  Rather, I merely argue
that exceptions to already-existing programs should not be permitted,
which would involve much less of an institutional strain on courts than
enforcement of orders to create, fund, and administer new pro-
grams.102 When government’s obligation to provide for health and
safety is threatened, courts should insist that legislation be supported
by a plausible policy basis. Courts may be predisposed to find such
support, but the inquiry should be substantial and genuine in order to
ensure that exceptions to health and safety laws are not naked interest-
group favors.103
My proposal should place only moderate constraints on govern-
ment’s ability to restructure programs designed to fulfill the duty to
provide for the health, safety, and welfare of citizens. While it may be
unconstitutional for government to make exceptions to such programs
out of pure interest-group favoritism, if it appears that reforms arise
out of genuine engagement with the policies surrounding a health,
safety, or welfare program, then such reforms should be sustained. In
this light, consider Congress’s 1996 replacement of Aid to Families
opinion for the Court in Lochner itself, finding insufficient support for the stated
health and welfare bases for the limitation on bakers’ hours at issue in that case,
speculated that some motive other than health and welfare must have been behind the
law. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62–63 (1905) (“When assertions such as
we have adverted to become necessary in order to give, if possible, a plausible foun-
dation for the contention that the law is a ‘health law,’ it gives rise to at least a
suspicion that there was some other motive dominating the legislature than the pur-
pose to subserve the public health or welfare.”). Justice Peckham’s opinion does not
specify what motives he suspected were at work. Id.
101. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 1706–07 (discussing the difficulty of administer- R
ing judicial requirements that programs be created to meet government’s positive
obligations).
102. Although much of this Article’s analysis may support the existence of a positive
right to government protection of health and safety, as an institutional matter, judicial
creation of mechanisms to realize such a right is beyond the accepted role of courts.
Realistically, judicial action may be acceptable only to protect programs that have
already been established through legislation.
103. Industry is very successful at marshalling resources to undercut the scientific
basis of regulation. See generally DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW
INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008).
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with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Transitional Aid to Needy
Families (TANF).104 These are safety-net welfare programs, the last
resort for people without other sources of income or support.105 The
AFDC program was criticized for creating a culture of dependency
that encouraged families to stay on welfare for generations.106 The
TANF program limits the amount of time a person can draw benefits,
and requires many recipients to work in order to continue receiving
benefits.107 There can certainly be genuine disagreement over whether
TANF’s reforms to the AFDC program were desirable, and there may
even be an argument that TANF benefits fall below what a wealthy
and civilized society should be obligated to provide.108 But given the
genuine engagement with policy issues that preceded this reform, and
with no obvious interest-group power grab implicated by the process,
TANF would not presumptively violate government’s obligation to
provide for the welfare of the poor under my proposed analysis.
Recognizing that interest-group-procured exceptions to health
and safety regulation raise significant constitutional concerns may be
worthwhile even if courts are extremely reluctant to actually invalidate
such legislation. Legislative and public discourse would be shaped by
the understanding that such exceptions are illegitimate. Legislators
concerned about the reaction of voters may be less likely to champion
legislation with only a thin veneer of policy support, especially if chal-
lenged by other members of the legislative body, or if they faced the
threat that evidence of untoward political influence might become
public during litigation.
104. The TANF program was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105.
105. Marianne P. Bitler & Hilary W. Hoynes, The State of the Social Safety Net in
the Post-Welfare Reform Era, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 71, 71–72 (2010),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall%202010/2010b_bpea_bitler.
PDF.
106. See PATRICK F. FAGAN & ROBERT RECTOR, HERITAGE FOUND., HOW WELFARE
HARMS KIDS (1996), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1996/06/bg1084nbsp-
how-welfare-harms-kids.
107. See Bitler & Hoynes, supra note 105, at 72 (“TANF . . . imposes stringent work R
requirements, sanctions for noncompliance, and lifetime time limits for receipt of
welfare.”).
108. See Laura R. Goldin, Note, The Safety Net Revisited? The Continuing Impact of
Welfare Reform in New York City and Nationwide, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 97,
100–01 (2007) (criticizing TANF). For a discussion of the differences between AFDC
and TANF, see Minor Myers, III, A Redistributive Role for Local Government, 36
URB. LAW. 753, 756–61 (2004) (comparing AFDC and TANF programs).
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CONCLUSION
Positive rights have not been recognized under the United States
Constitution. However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision invalidat-
ing the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion makes sense only if state gov-
ernments feel an obligation to ensure access to health care for all.
Similarly, pervasive regulation and dire social need have contrib-
uted to the creation of a legal regime under which it is understood that
government has an obligation to protect public health and safety.
Contemporary society is fraught with danger, much of it unseen and
undetectable by the average person. People depend on government
regulation to ensure the safety of virtually every human activity. The
water we drink, the food we eat, the clothes we wear, the cars we
drive, the buildings we live in, and more would all be far more danger-
ous without effective government regulation. Unsuspecting and trust-
ing people are deceived every day by purveyors of unsafe or useless
products, and due to effective interest-group advocacy, many products
that should be regulated are not. Without necessarily adopting a full-
blown theory of positive rights, courts, legislatures, and regulators
should recognize that exceptions to health and safety regulation vio-
late government’s basic duty to its citizens and should be thought of as
unconstitutional.  Statutes like the Proxmire Amendment have no
place in the contemporary regulatory state.
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